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RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S LAW № 87-ФЗ:
POLITICAL MACHINATION OR
PROCEDURAL REFORM?
Kirill Ershov*
ABSTRACT: Law 87-ФЗ was signed by Russian President
Vladimir Putin six months prior to the December 2007
presidential election. Law 87-Ф3 rearranged the division of
functions between the investigator and the procurator during
the preliminary investigation. It also saw the creation of the
investigative committee within the procuracy, which would have
exclusive supervision of all investigations within that branch.
Because of the Committee’s personal jurisdiction over
investigations involving individuals with official immunity and
agents of Russia’s power structures, both Russian media and
Western academia saw the law as being politically motivated by
the upcoming transfer of power. The new law is seen as a
further step in Russia’s transition away from a Soviet
procurator-centered criminal procedure system and toward a
judicial oversight model consistent with adversarial principles.
This paper examines the political rationalizations for law 87Ф3 reforms and points out the flaws. While not denying the
1

2

PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION

[Vol. I::VII

validity of these justifications, this paper posits that such
explanations are unverifiable.
The paper concludes by
providing procedural justifications for law 87-Ф3.
INTRODUCTION
Six months prior to the December 2007 Russian election,
which would legitimize Dmitri Medvedev, Vladimir Putin’s heir
apparent, as the President of the Russian Federation, the
Russian Legislature passed law “From 6.5.2007 No. 87-Ф3”
(hereinafter “law 87-Ф3”). Signed by Putin on June 5, 2007,
the law was due to take full effect in ninety days. 1 Law 87-Ф3
rearranged the division of functions between the investigator
and the procurator during the preliminary investigatory stage
of a prosecution. It also created the investigative committee
within the procuracy and gave the committee exclusive
supervision of all investigations within that branch. Because of
the committee’s personal jurisdiction over investigations
involving individuals with official immunity and agents of
Russia’s power structures, both Russian media and Western
academia saw the law as being politically motivated by the
upcoming transfer of power.
After a brief description of the preliminary investigation as
implemented in Russia, this paper examines the political
rationalizations for law 87-Ф3 reforms and points out the
flaws. While not denying validity of the law’s rationalizations,
this paper posits that such explanations are unverifiable and
provides procedural justifications for law 87-Ф3.
In its
rearrangement of the procurator’s relationship with the
preliminary investigation, law 87-Ф3 is seen as a further step
in Russia’s transition away from a Soviet procurator-centered
criminal procedure system and toward a judicial oversight
model consistent with adversarial principles.

* Esquire; Clerk, Capital Habeas Unit, Federal Public Defender for the
Central District of California; J.D. UCLA School of Law, 2009; B.A. Univ. of
California Berkeley, 2001. For comments and criticism, please contact me at
kirill.g.ershov@gmail.com.
1 Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian
Federation Collection of Legislation] 2007, No. 87, Item 3, available at
http://www.consultant.ru/online/base/?req=doc;base=LAW;n=38313;p=2.
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THE 2001 CODE
The modern role of the procurator in the Russian
Federation still retains some of the Soviet conception of the
procurator’s judicial functions. The Soviet system was centered
on the procurator as the guarantor of observance of citizens’
rights during the judicial process: “[S]upervision over the exact
execution of the laws of the USSR, the RSFSR [Soviet Republic
of Russia], and autonomous republics in criminal proceedings
shall be exercised by the USSR procurator general both directly
and through the RSFSR procurator and other procurators
subordinate to him.” 2 This approach has been deemed the
“procuracy supervision” in order to contrast it with the “judicial
oversight” model of Western systems. 3
In terms of an inquisitorial or continental model of
criminal procedure, the preliminary investigation is the stage
which precedes the trial and during which all evidence to be
used against the accused is gathered. 4 Under procuracy
supervision, the procurator was seen as the final arbiter in the
realm of preliminary investigation. The procurator had the
power to vacate a criminal case, 5 along with the final authority
over a suspect’s pre-trial detention 6 and over the legality of
searches and seizures: 7 “Appeals from actions of an agency of
inquiry or an investigator shall be made to a procurator 8 [and]
[a]ppeals from actions and decisions of a procurator shall be

2 Ugolovno-Protsessual’nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedure Code]
art. 25 (Russ.), reprinted in HAROLD J. BERMAN, RUSSIAN RESEARCH CENTER
STUDIES, SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: THE RSFSR CODES (Harold J.
Berman & James W. Spindler trans., Harvard Univ. Press 2d ed.1972). This
conception of the procurator was inherited from Tsarist Russia. See
Jonathan Greenberg, The Kremlin’s Eye: The 21st Century Prokuratura in the
Russian Authoritarian Tradition, 45 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2009).
3 A. Khaliulin & V. Nazarenko, From Procuracy Supervision to Judicial
Oversight, in 41 STATUTES AND DECISIONS 31 (2005).
4 See A. SMIRNOV & K. KALINOVSKI, UGOLOVNI PROCESS, [THE CRIMINAL
PROCESS] 346 (2008).
5 UPK art. 116.
6 William Burnham & Jeffrey Kahn, Russia’s Criminal Procedure Code
Five Years Out, 33 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 1, § 2.2 (2008) (citing UPK arts. 2,
89, 96, 97).
7 UPK arts. 167, 168, 218-20.
8 Id. art. 218.
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brought to a higher procurator.” 9 Even during the trial phase,
the procurator often had the final word over procedural legality
because the trial courts’ exercise of authority frequently
consisted of rubberstamping procuratorial decisions. 10
Judicial oversight first entered Russian procedure after the
Soviet collapse, when the Constitutional Court extended
supervisory power over preliminary investigations to the
courts. 11 In 1993, the new Russian Constitution declared that
“judicial proceedings shall be conducted based on adversarial
principles and equality of the parties.” 12
In 1999 the
Constitutional Court found the Constitution as granting
individuals a right to appeal state preliminary investigation
actions that substantially restricted their rights and freedoms.
Then in 2001, with the passing of the Criminal Procedure Code
of the Russian Federation (“the 2001 Code”), the legislature
adopted judicial oversight principles directly into the Code of
Criminal Procedure. In addition to courts expanding their
jurisdiction to hear appeals, the courts were required to
authorize key state actions during the preliminary
investigation, such as preliminary detentions and searches and
seizures. 13
Although the new Criminal Procedure Code’s reforms took
away the procurator’s final word over the legality of
investigative actions, these reforms also worked to consolidate
the procurator’s powers over the investigative process from the
perspective of the state. Specifically, procurators were given
more powers over the actions of investigators in that a criminal
case could no longer be opened without an approval of the
Id. art. 220.
Stephen C. Thaman, The Nullification of the Russian Jury: Lessons for
Jury-Inspired Reform in Eurasia and Beyond, 40 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 355, 357
(2007).
11 Khaliulin & Nazarenko, supra note 3, at 31.
12 Burnham & Kahn, supra note 6, § 2.2 (citing Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi
Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 123(3)).
13 Authorizations are required for detentions exceeding forty-eight hours
and for searches of residences and of individuals, when not incident to arrest.
For detentions, see Burnham & Kahn, supra note 6, at 11 (citing UgolovnoProtsessual’nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedure Code] art. 10[1] (Russ.)).
For searches and seizures, see id. at 46 (citing UPK art. 29[2]). For
discussion on appeals, see Khaliulin & Nazarenko, supra note 3, at 32 (citing
UPK art. 125).
9

10
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procurator. 14 Following a procurator’s consent, the preliminary
investigation was to be conducted as directed by the
procurator. 15 A procurator’s consent was also required prior to
an investigator’s petition to the court for a court-authorized
search and seizure and pre-trial detention authorizations. 16
Consequently, the 2001 Code’s break with the Soviet model
can be seen as taking away most of the procurator’s power over
the determination of the legality of the preliminary
investigation and replacing it with the responsibility for that
legality from the perspective of the state.
INVESTIGATIVE JURISDICTION
In Russia the concept of investigative subject matter
jurisdiction governs which investigative agency has jurisdiction
over which type of crime. 17 This concept is analogous to the
divisions in jurisdictions of various federal investigative
agencies in the United States, such as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF).
The majority of preliminary investigations are handled by
investigators of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) which is
commonly referred to as Militsia. 18 Militsia investigators
handle crimes such as burglary, 19 theft, fraud, and
racketeering as related to organized crime, 20 money
laundering, 21 sale or purchase of illegally obtained goods, 22 and
receiving and taking bribes. 23
Two other notable investigative agencies are the Federal
Security Service (FSB) and the Federal Drug Control Service
(FSKN). FSB is the successor to the Soviet KGB (Komitet
14
15
16
17

151.
18
19
20
21
22
23

Burnham & Kahn, supra note 6, § 2.2 (citing UPK art. 146).
UPK art. 146.
See UPK art. 37.
See SMIRNOV & KALINOVSKI, supra note 4, at 356-60; see also UPK art.
Id. at 357.
Ugolovnyi Kodeks [UK] [Criminal Code] art. 151 (Russ.).
Id. arts. 158, 151,163.
Id. art. 174.
Id. art. 175.
Id. arts. 290-91.
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Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti or Committee for State
Security); its investigators handle crimes that can be perceived
as crimes perpetrated against the state as a whole, rather than
a specific individual. Namely, the FSB handles crimes such as
contraband activity by state officials, 24 and those involving
FSKN, on the other hand,
terrorism 25 and espionage. 26
handles investigations related to drug enforcement, specifically
crimes relating to the possession, manufacture, or sale of
drugs 27 and drug precursors. 28
Under the subject matter investigative jurisdiction,
investigators of the procuracy handle crimes that are
considered to pose the greatest threat to society, such as
murder, kidnapping, and rape. 29 These investigators are also
responsible for a wide range of cases falling under their control
through the personal jurisdiction exception to the subject
Under personal
matter investigative jurisdiction rules. 30
jurisdiction, the procuracy is assigned investigations of people
whose official immunity status entitles their investigations to
greater oversight in the chain of command. Individuals
entitled to official immunity include members of the federation
council (upper house of the legislature), state duma (lower
house of the legislature), federal judges or jurors, procurators,
investigators, lawyers, or the president of the Russian
Procuracy
investigators
also
handle
Federation. 31
investigations dealing with crimes committed by agents of the
other investigative agencies that are related to their official
duties. 32
Id. art.188 [2].
UK arts. 290-91.
26 Id. arts. 275-76, 283.
27 Id. arts. 228 [2], 228.1.
28 Id. art. 232 [2].
29 SMIRNOV & KALINOVSKI, supra note 4, at 357 (citing UPK art. 151).
Murder can be found in article 105 of the Criminal Procedure Code;
kidnapping is defined in article 126; and rape is defined in article 131.
29 UPK art. 155[1][b].
30 UPK art. 155 [1] [b].
31 Following Law No.87-Ф3, approval of the head of the investigative
committee under the procuracy of the Russian Federation is required for
opening of criminal cases against individuals with highest form of official
immunity. See UPK arts. 447-48.
32 UPK art. 155 [1][c]. The only exception to procuracy’s personal
24
25
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Key exceptions to power granted by subject matter
investigative jurisdiction include universal jurisdiction and
alternative jurisdiction.
Through universal jurisdiction a
procurator can withdraw any case from another agency’s
jurisdiction and give it to a procuracy investigator. 33 Through
alternative jurisdiction, officials of any investigative branch
can investigate a limited range of crimes uncovered during
performance of their duties. 34
THE 2007 REFORMS
The year 2007 was Vladimir Putin’s last year in power as
the President of the Russian Federation and the year during
which the election determining his successor was held. The
first major reforms in Russia’s Code of Criminal Procedure
since the implementation of the 2001 Code also occurred in
2007. Law 87-Ф3 rearranged the division of functions between
an investigator and a procurator during the preliminary
investigation and created the investigative committee within
the procuracy. Signed in early June, the law was due to come
into effect in ninety days. 35
Law 87-Ф3 takes the control over the preliminary
investigation away from the procurator. 36 The procurator’s
consent to the opening of a criminal case has been limited to a
right to refusal within twenty-four hours of receiving a
resolution of the opening of the case, which is to be sent by the
investigator immediately after opening. Refusal can be made
on the grounds that the opening of the case is illegal or that it
is unsupported by evidence; there are no extensions of the

jurisdiction concerns the above-mentioned types of individuals that are
accused of espionage related crimes; those cases are assigned to FSB
investigators. SMIRNOV & KALINOVSKI, supra note 4, at 359.
33 UPK art. 37[2][12].
34 UPK art. 151[5] (governs alternative jurisdiction). The range of crimes
subject to this exception under the Criminal Code includes articles 158[3-4]
and 159[2-4] (severe kinds of theft and fraud respectively); 172-74 (financial
crimes); and 208-10 (relating to organized crime and banditry).
35 Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian
Federation Collection of Legislation] 2007, No. 87, Item 3, available at
http://www.consultant.ru/online/base/?req=doc;base=LAW;n=38313;p=2.
36 UPK art. 144, amended by SZ RF No. 87, Item 3 § 54.
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twenty-four hour window. 37 The procurator loses all input
regarding the handling of the case by the investigator. The
procurator’s prior powers over the direction of the case, such as
his consent of investigators’ petitions for actions requiring
court authorizations, have been imputed to the head of the
The only way a
investigative body under law 87-Ф3. 38
procurator can now influence the direction of the investigation
is through a refusal to certify the investigator’s conclusion that
the investigation is finished and the case is ready for trial.
Upon such refusal, the case is sent back for further
investigation. 39
Law 87-Ф3 also creates the investigative committee under
the procuracy of the Russian Federation. The investigative
committee includes the hierarchy of investigative bodies within
the procuracy.
Law 87-Ф3 strips the control over the
preliminary investigation from the procurator and assigns it to
the head of an investigative body. 40 All decisions of an
investigator regarding a preliminary investigation are subject
to the approval of the head of the investigative body. An
investigator can appeal the head’s decisions to the head of the
higher order investigative body. 41 This schema is combined
with the following facts: (a) the head of the hierarchy, the first
assistant to the procurator general, is nominated by the
president and can be appointed and removed only through
legislation by the federation council, 42 (b) the first assistant
will have full discretion over the appointment of his
subordinates, and (c) the committee’s financial independence 43
makes the investigative committee a part of the procuracy in
UPK art. 146, amended by SZ RF No. 87, Item 3 § 56.
UPK art. 39, amended by SZ RF No. 87, Item 3 § 9.
39 UPK art. 146, amended by SZ RF No. 87, Item 3 § 56.
40 UPK art. 39, amended by SZ RF No. 87, Item 3 § 9.
41 UPK art. 146 [3].
42 Ruslan Kadrmatov, Sledstvie Veli . . . Genprokuraturu RF Lishili
Chasti Polnomchii ee Razdvoili [Investigation was Led by . . . The Procuracy
of RF is Stripped from Some of Its Obligations and Is Split in Half],
LENTA.RU, (Russ.), May 11, 2007, http://Lenta.ru/articles/2007/05/11/
sledstvie/.
43 Stephen Blank, The Putin Succession and Its Implications for Russian
Politics, INST. FOR SECURITY & DEVELOPMENTALPOL ’Y 19 (Feb. 2008),
available at http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2008_blank_the
-putin-succession-and-its-implications.pdf.
37
38
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name, but an independent investigative agency in function.
The only input that a procurator has into a preliminary
investigation, aside from his ability to deny an investigator’s
request to forward a case to trial, is through his oversight
function as a guarantor of citizens’ rights. This oversight has
been greatly diminished since the procurator has lost all
control over the course of the investigation. Whenever the
procurator is put on notice of the violation of a private party’s
rights during an investigation, his or her only option is to
notify the investigator of the violation and to appeal to the
head of the investigative body if the investigator’s response is
unsatisfactory. 44 Appeals can be made all the way up to the
procurator general, although a procurator must wait for an
unsatisfactory response prior to appealing to the next ranking
head. The only temporal limitation on a response to a
procurator’s appeal is that it be made within a reasonable
amount of time. 45
RAISON D’ETRE AND/OR POLITICS
The legislation’s drastic impact on the criminal process in
Russia, and the timing and speed with which it was
implemented raised eyebrows in both Russian media and
western academic press. 46 Russia’s mainstream media was
UPK art. 37 [6].
Aleksandr Aleksandrov, Zhivoi Ugolok: Uchenni Disput Pro
Prokurorski Nadzor ei Sledstvenni Komitet [Live Corner: Academic Dispute
over Procutorial Oversight and the Investigative Committee], Int’l Union of
Assistance of Justice (Russ.), http://iuaj.net/modules.php?name=News&file
=article&sid=372&mode=&order=0&thold=0 (last visited June 2, 2009).
46 The legislature first heard the law at the end of March with
investigators stopping taking procurators orders by early September of the
same year. Kadrmatov, supra note 42. Blank sees the creation of the
committee as the “icing on the cake” of Kremlin elites’ machinations to
preserve power during the elections. Blank, supra note 43, at 23. The
legislation was set to take effect ninety days after passing. See SZ RF No. 87,
Item 3, available at http://www.consultant.ru/online/base/?req=doc;base=
LAW;n=38313;p=2. To determine whether this is eyebrow raising quick,
contrast to the 2001 legislation that implemented all the changes in the
newly rewritten Criminal Procedure Code, which was passed in December
2001 and became effective on July 1, 2002 (around 180 days). SZ RF No. 177,
Item 3, available at http://www.consultant.ru/online/base/?req=doc;base=
LAW;n=70219No.p73. The latter is a Russian Legal Database for the law
that implemented the 2001 Code.
44
45
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quick to point out that the legislation did not fully conform to
the motivations underlying its existence.
Reform of the
investigative process has been previously proposed, but such
reform included the creation of a unified investigative service,
one that would subsume the different agencies, such as MVD,
FSB and FSKN, thus addressing the problems presented by
their overlapping jurisdiction.
While law 87-Ф3 was officially characterized as a first step
towards such a service, by taking away procuratorial control
over the opening and direction of criminal cases in the
investigative agencies, it was essentially seen as playing a
dividing, rather than a unifying function. As a result, the
investigative agencies saw a gain in independence rather than
deferring additional control. 47 Also, the official goal of putting
a check on the procuracy’s control over both the investigative
and the accusatory parts of the criminal process was perceived
to be undermined by the legislation’s effect of freeing the
investigations agencies of legal oversight by the procuracy and
the inability of the courts to implement judicial oversight of
their own. 48 The commentators were further puzzled by the
procurator general’s official support of the legislation despite
its weakening the procuracy’s strength as an institution, and
the widespread discontent within the procuracy. 49 Due to the
above inconsistencies, the mainstream media saw political
considerations as being primary to the official explanations put
forth by the administration and the legislature.
Aleksandr Bastrykin, who was Putin’s university
classmate, and who indeed became the head of the
investigative committee, was seen as the primary candidate for
the position. With Bastrykin’s nomination came the realization
that individuals with personal relations to Putin would be at
the head of every one of Russia’s power structures, thus
ensuring stability during the transfer to the new presidency.
As the head of the investigative committee under the
procuracy, Bastrykin joined Putin’s ex-FSB colleagues, Nicolai
Patrushev and Victor Cherkesov, who headed the FSB and the
FSKN respectively. In addition, Putin’s university classmate
47
48
49

Kadrmatov, supra note 42.
Id.
Id.
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Aleksey Anichin, headed the MVD, while Andrei Belianinov,
Putin’s colleague at the KGB in East Germany, headed the
Federal Customs Service. 50
Western academic publications that addressed law 87-Ф3’s
raison d’etre (reason for being) also saw it as primarily
politically motivated.
In Law as Politics: The Russian
Procuracy and Its Investigative Committee, Ethan Burger and
Mary Holland found the committee to be “a creature of politics,
not law.” 51 The authors saw Vladimir Putin, throughout his
career, as one to use the procuracy as an instrument for
consolidation of wealth and political power. In a realm
permeated with corruption, Putin has wielded the procuracy’s
power to selectively prosecute regional politicians as
enforcement of his drive to yoke Russia’s federal regions and
municipalities under his power vertical (hierarchy of power
under Putin). 52 Similarly, the procuracy has been used to
perform massive wealth transfers through nationalization and
re-sale of illegal assets. The authors saw the Yukos affair as
the most notable example of this policy, where at the time,
Russia’s richest man, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, was imprisoned,
when his company Yukos declared bankruptcy and its $100
billion in assets resold to the highest bidder. 53 In Burger’s and
Holland’s opinion, the creation of the investigative committee
and the naming of Aleksandr Bastrykin as its head was a move
Id.
Ethan Burger & Mary Holland, Law as Politics: The Russian
Procuracy and Its Investigative Committee, 2 COLUM. J. E. EUR. L. 143, 185
(2008).
52 “The procuracy selectively prosecuted corrupt officials whom the
government disfavored. Vladivostok’s former mayor fits this description, as
does the mayor of Volgograd. By contrast, Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov is
well placed enough that he has engaged in extremely questionable activities
more than ten years without legal challenge.” Id. at 170 (internal citations
omitted).
53 “The Yukos expropriation is especially important because the assets
were so enormous; the Presidential Administration’s and procuracy’s methods
against Yukos, its owners and employees, so severe; and the prosecutions
have had such symbolic impact both in Russia and abroad. Former economic
adviser, Andrei Illarionov, characterized the seizure and reselling of Yukos’
assets to Rosneft as ‘the biggest scam of 2006.’ He said, ‘This falls under the
category of what people call the sale of stolen property.’ These actions
against Yukos undermined property rights, discouraged investment and
sparked capital flight.” Id. at 175.
50
51
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that further streamlined the president’s control of the political
investigations process by bypassing Yuri Chaika, the
procurator general (i.e., the head of the procuracy). 54
In The Putin Succession and Its Implications for Russian
Politics, Stephen Blank saw the decision to cut the procurator
general out of the investigations process as a move motivated
by power struggles within Kremlin’s siloviki clans. Siloviki
literally translates to “strongmen” and refers to heads of power
structures, such as the investigative agencies and the
procuracy that make up rival Kremlin clans. Blank and other
commentators saw the clans as an instance of a feudal system
of power based on political patronage and control of rentgenerating governmental institutions. Previously this system
has been implemented through the workings of the Communist
Party, and prior to that, through intrigue within the Tsar’s
courts. Succession has always been a problematic aspect of
such systems, as it realigns the pyramid of power structured on
personal patronage. 55 According to Blank, Putin’s appointment
of a loyal individual to head the investigative committee was
Putin’s way to hedge and secure governmental positions within
his successor Medvedev’s administration. This move would
insure that Putin and his appointees are protected from
political ambitions of rival siloviki and potential threats of
political investigation and prosecution. 56
THE VERIFIABILITY PRINCIPLE
The Verifiability Principle holds that a statement is only
meaningful if it is tautological or if it is empirically verifiable. 57
The key problem with political rationalizations, such as the
ones presented for law 87-Ф3 above, is that without reliable
sources of information, such as documents made public through
the Freedom of Information Act in the United States, these
rationalizations are more akin to axioms rather than empirical
statements. The political rationalizations described in this
Id. at 185.
Blank, supra note 43, at 3-8
56 Id. at 24-25.
57 Encyclopedia Britannica, Verifiability Principle, http://www.britannica
.com/EBchecked/topic/626091/verifiability-principle (last visited May 4, 2009).
54
55
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paper function as valid arguments only if their premises are
assumed to be true. Like the problem of evil in theology, where
the presence of cruelty in the world can either be seen as
logically inconsistent with the existence of God or, instead, as a
necessary hardship provided by a benevolent deity to promote
spiritual growth, the validity of such rationalizations can
neither be confirmed nor denied through observation. From
some points of view, because law 87-Ф3 was passed in a
climate of a siloviki struggle for the incumbent presidency, its
raison d’etre must be necessarily connected to that struggle,
with observations consistent with such a rationalization
proving the point, and with contrary observations instead
evidencing miscalculation on the behalf of the siloviki.
Every observation supporting a political rationalization
can be countered with an equally valid counter-observation.
The Russian media’s speculation that the investigative
committee’s formation headed by Aleksandr Bastrykin was
motivated by Putin’s desire to stabilize the power structures
through the installment of his university classmate 58 can be
countered by the destabilizing results of these events. Soon
after taking control of the investigative committee, Aleksandr
Bastrykin proceeded to make two high-profile arrests and
detentions—that of General Bulbov, 59 the right hand man to
58 The fact that Bastrykin was Putin’s university classmate is not
indicative of anything in particular. Chaika who’s authority under this
theory Bastrykin was supposed to undercut can also be seen as connected to
Putin, as it was reported that it was Putin then acting as Prime Minister who
championed Chaika for the position of Minister of Justice in 2001 and later
named him to the procurator General position as president in 2006. Chaika,
Yuriy, General’niy Prokuror Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Biographiya [Yuriy
Chaika, General Procurator of Russian Federation, Biography],
http://Lenta.ru/lib/14159398/ (last visited June 4, 2006) (Russ.).
59 Bulbov was arrested on October 2, 2007. Aleksandr Bulbov –
Biography, http://Lenta.ru/lib/14184728/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2010) (Russ.).
He was accused of numerous crimes including giving and receiving bribes (in
violation of articles 290[4] and 291[2] of the Criminal Procedure Code
respectively) and illegal wiretapping (in violation of article 138[2] of the
Criminal Procedure Code). Investigative Committee Under the Procuracy of
the Russian Federation, Generalu Bulbovu Prediavleno Obvinenie v
Okonchatelnoi Redactsii [General Bulbov is Presented with an Accusation in
a Final Form], http://www.sledcomproc.ru/news/1123/ (last visited Sept. 20,
2009) (Russ.). The investigative committee had jurisdiction to investigate
Bulbov under personal jurisdiction (article 155[1][c] of the Criminal
Procedure Code) as it was investigating an official of an investigative agency
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FSKN head Victor Cherkesov, 60 and that of Sergey Storchak, 61
the Assistant Minister of finances. The procuracy publicly
questioned and opposed the arrests, both in the media and in
the courts. 62 In regards to the reaction by FSKN, Cherkesov
publicly denounced his first general’s arrest and blew the
whistle on the silovki’s struggle for power, which up until that
point, no official had ever been publicly acknowledged. 63
for crimes committed when in performance of duties. For more on personal
jurisdiction of the investigative committee under the procuracy, see the
Investigative Jurisdiction section of this paper.
60 Burger and Holland see this arrest, as well as the murder, of two
individuals connected to the FSKN as payback by the FSB for FSKN’s
involvement in the ‘three whales’ scandal during which high ranking FSB
officials were implicated in smuggling and money laundering. Burger &
Holland, supra note 51, at 172, 186.
61 Storchak was arrested on November 15, 2007. Sergei Storchak Biography, http://Lenta.ru/lib/14185567/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2009) (Russ.).
Storchak was charged with attempt to commit large-scale fraud falling under
article 159[4] of the Criminal Code. Under article 151[2][3] of the Criminal
Procedure Code, this crime falls into the subject matter jurisdiction of the
MVD. The investigative committee does not have personal jurisdiction per
[2][1][b] of the same article as Storchak is not entitled to official immunity, or
per [2][1][c] as Storchak is not an agent of an investigative agency or other
agencies falling under the subsection. The Committee could investigate
Storchak under universal jurisdiction only if a procurator had officially
transferred his case to it from the MVD, this is unlikely as the procuracy
publicly opposed Storchak's arrest. Consequently, the Committee must have
acted under alternative jurisdiction (article 151[5] of the Criminal Procedure
Code) since the fraud that Storchak was accused of committing falls under
the range of crimes that can be investigated by any agency if it discovers it in
performance of its duties. For more on universal and alternative jurisdiction,
refer to the Investigative Jurisdiction section of this paper.
62 In regards to both Bulbov and Storchak’s arrests, the procuracy filed
petitions for dismissal. Burger & Holland, supra note 52, at 185-91;
Aleksandr Aleksandrov, Zhivoi Ugolok: Mezhdu Tuchami ei Morem Gordo
Reet Tov. Bulbov [Live Corner: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, Mr. Bulbov
Stands
Firm],
http://iuaj103.valuehost.ru/modules.php?file=article&name=News&sid=340
(last visted June 10, 2009). Furthermore, following the arrests, the procuracy
relying on its function as the guarantor of citizens’ rights and overseer of the
legality of the criminal process, launched a wide scale audit into investigative
committee’s compliance with the law. Burger & Holland, supra note 51, at
188. Burger and Holland along with Russian commentators see this audit as
countermove in the procuracy’s struggle against the investigative committee.
Id.
63 Victor Cherkesov, Warriors Must Not Turn into Traders, KOMMERSANT,
Oct.
9,
2007,
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=812840,
translation available at http://www.robertamsterdam.com/2007/10/viktor_
cherkesov_on_the_spy_wa.htm.
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If the Kremlin’s intent was to stabilize the relations
between the power structures, then this scheme can be
considered a failure, as the investigative committee’s actions
saw an unraveling of an internal power struggle into a fullblown war waged in the media, the courts and the streets.
Burger and Holland consider the Bulbov and Storchak
affairs as further proof of their thesis that “the Russian
Presidential Administration under former President Vladimir
Putin misused the procuracy for political purposes.” 64 The
Bulbov and Storchak affairs are addressed in detail and
presented as continuations of the Kremlin’s use of criminal
investigations for political purposes; yet, the details of these
affairs evidence chaos rather than orchestrated manipulation
for political gain. In terms of institutional control, law 87-Ф3 is
a destructive rather than a consolidating force.
The
investigative organs of the various power structures no longer
need the procuracy’s consent to open criminal cases;
consequently these structures become significantly more
independent in terms of their institutional actions.
While it is true that through personal and universal
jurisdiction exceptions the investigative committee remains the
preferred tool for political investigation, its powers are still far
from limitless, even after the enactment of law 87-Ф3. For
example, the procurator is still required to give consent before
the investigative committee can exercise a universal
jurisdiction over a case. 65 Furthermore as a political weapon,
the investigative committee will only give so much, as it is still
up to the procuracy to prosecute the case in court. As of the
time of this writing, and approximately two years after their
arrests, neither Storchak’s nor Bulbov’s cases have proceeded
to the trial phase. 66 This can be compared to Khodorkovsky,
cited by Burger and Holland as an earlier victim of the
Kremlin’s abuse of power, where Khodorkovsky was arrested,

Burger & Holland, supra note 51, at 143.
See UPK art. 37[2][12]; see also supra text in Investigative Jurisdiction
section of this paper.
66 Storchak was arrested on November, 15, 2007.
Sergei Storchak –
Biography, http://Lenta.ru/lib/14185567/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2010). Bulbov
was arrested on October 2, 2007. Aleksandr Bulbov – Biography,
http://Lenta.ru/lib/14184728/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2010).
64
65
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convicted and sentenced within a year and a half, under the
supervision of a unified procuracy. 67 If law 87-Ф3 functioned as
designed, then the comparison works to undermine Burger and
Holland’s thesis that it was implemented to streamline political
investigations and prosecutions.
The fact that law 87-Ф3 splits the previously united
investigative and prosecutorial powers makes both the
investigative committee and the procuracy a per se lesseffective political weapon than a unified procuracy.
By
creating the investigative committee, law 87-Ф3 creates a new
institutional player whose concerns need to be accommodated
prior to its participation in the implementation of any political
objective. While this does not mean that law 87-Ф3 is indeed a
creature of law rather than politics, its creation is far from an
elegant fit into Burger’s and Holland’s thesis.
As to Blank, his thesis suffers from the same problem. In
his paper, Blank refers to the creation of the Committee as the
“icing on the cake” of Kremlin’s machinations, aimed at
insuring the survival of vested players through the succession
process: “[G]iven Bastrykin’s personal loyalty to Putin, it seems
clear that Putin is manipulating the ‘power vertical’ to ensure
that he and his appointments hold on to power in Medvedev
period by upholding the threat of investigation and prosecution
over all officials and politically interested personages.” 68
Considering law 87-Ф3’s effects on the Criminal Procedure
Code, such a statement would have been more appropriate had
the legislature started out with two divided institutions and
fused them into the same organ under the control of Putin’s
longtime colleague Procurator General Yuri Chaika. 69 Given
that the head of the investigative committee Bastrykin has no
prosecution power whatsoever, it seems that Putin and his
protectees would have been better hedged under Chaika’s
supervision of a unified procuracy.

67 Khodorkovsky was arrested on October 25, 2003; on May 31, 2005, he
was convicted and sentenced to nine years in prison. Mikhail Khodorkovsky –
Biography, http://Lenta.ru/lib/14159417/full.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2010).
68 Blank, supra note 43, at 24-25.
69 See infra text accompanying note 79.
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PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS
Aside from politics and in terms of procedural innovation,
law 87-Ф3 can be seen as another step in Russia’s transition
from procuracy supervision to judicial oversight initiated by the
collapse of the Soviet Union and enshrined in the 2001
Criminal Procedure Code. 70 While law 87-Ф3 retains Article
37’s provision that the procurator shall “exert supervision over
the procedural activity of the bodies of inquiry and of the bodies
for the preliminary investigation” as to preliminary
investigations, this oversight loses any vestiges of judicial
functions that it had retained from procuracy supervision
under the Soviet model. Specifically, the procurator can no
longer determine the legality of an investigator’s action; he can
only voice his objections and hope that they are considered in
the investigative organ.
While it is true that through this reform an involved party,
such as a victim or suspect, loses a practical avenue to voice
objections over the investigator’s actions, it nonetheless steers
complaints towards the courts, which is the appropriate avenue
for resolution of such disputes. Considering the current
accusatory functions of the procurator as well as historic
functions of the procuracy within Russian society, a procurator
is not capable of exercising true due diligence when arbitrating
individual party appeals of investigators' actions. This is
because the procuracy objectives have been and are still
intertwined with the objectives of the state. 71 According to prelaw 87-Ф3 statistics for 2007, courts remedied a greater
fraction of involved parties’ complaints than the procurators. 72
The difference between the remedial proportions of the
procurators and the courts is miniscule; procurators remedied
every sixth objection filed by an individual party in regards to
preliminary investigations, whereas the courts remedied every
See discussion supra section on The 2001 Code.
See SMIRNOV & KALINOVSKI, supra note 4, at 134. For a western
examination of the procuracy’s history as an instrument of the sovereign, see
Jonathan Greenberg, The Kremlin’s Eye: The 21st Century Prokuratura in the
Russian Authoritarian Tradition, 45 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (2009).
72 Posting
of Dr. Mikhail Silnov to Dura Lex Sed Lex,
http://blogs.privet.ru/community/femida/49188298 (Nov. 4, 2008, 13:12 Russ.
T.) (citing statistics from Supreme Court of the Russian Federation).
70
71
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fifth. Given the conditions in Russia, where the courts are still
often overly deferential to the state, 73 the proximity of the
statistics is indicative of the lack of objectivity in the courts.
Although this statistic is a problem, it is not suggestive by
itself that the procurator is a more proper venue to remedy
appeals brought by individual parties. 74
Law 87-Ф3 can also be seen as a step away from the 2001
Code’s violation of the principle that holds that investigation
and accusation should not be vested in the same body, ne
procedat judex ex officio (one who investigates must not be the
one to accuse). 75 Under this principle, a prosecutor’s desire to
obtain a conviction interferes with the impartial truth-finding
functions of an investigator. Russian commentators saw the
procurator’s release from investigative functions as a method to
allow a more efficient oversight of the propriety of investigators
actions by exercising the right to deny certification to
investigations deemed unwarranted. In this sense, law 87-Ф3
can overcome institutional biases that could have previously
contributed to a procurator overlooking such improprieties. 76
The separation of powers can result in proper checks and
balances that enable each to motivate the other to properly
73 Thaman, supra note 10, at 35; see also Yelina Kvurt, Selective
Prosecution in Russia – Myth or Reality?, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 127
(2007); Jeffrey Kahn, Vladimir Putin and the Rule of Law in Russia, 36 GA. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 511 (2008).
74 Russian commentators point to the greater volume of appeals heard by
procurators than courts, 521,480 to 43,903 in 2007 arguing that following
Law No.87-Ф3 as the sole practical avenue for these complaints the courts
will not be able to handle the same volume as the procurators. See Posting of
Dr. Mikhail Silnov, supra note 76; SMIRNOV & KALINOVSKI, supra note 4, at
134 (citing Obshestvenni Verdict [Public Verdict], June 28, 2007,
http://control.hro.org/okno/pr/2007/06/28.php.).
75 Carlo Guarnieri, Judicial Education as a Support to Judicial
Independence and Major Justice Reform, in THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON THE TRAINING OF THE JUDICIARY: JUDICIAL EDUCATION IN A
WORLD OF CHALLENGE AND CHANGE (2004), available at www.nji.ca/nji/
internationalforum/Guarnieri.pdf. This principle is implemented differently
in various systems, for example, in France the prosecutor, upon finding
serious presumptions that a crime has occurred, officially requests for the
investigative judge to investigate it. See Bron Mckillop, Anatomy of a French
Murder Case, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 527, 534-35 (1997).
76 A.
Smirnov & K. Kalinovski, Komentari K UGOLOVNOPROSESSUALNOMU KODEKSU ROSSII, POSTATEINI, [Per Statute, Commentary to
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE OF RUSSIA] 134 (2008) (Russ.).
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perform their functions.
Commentators have criticized
procurators for the low quality of cases presented in court. 77
This is often caused by poor investigations that are enabled by
sympathetic trial courts that produce convictions regardless of
the sufficiency of the evidence. 78 As far as these problems are
caused by the intermingling of the investigative, the
prosecutorial, and the judicial branches, law 87-Ф3 appears to
be a proper remedial step.
As it were, the three branches could not properly check
each other if the procurator identifies with the investigator and
the courts identify with the procurator.
These cross
identifications would not have ceased while the procurator
performed both investigative and judicial functions.
By
segregating the prosecution from the investigation (i.e.,
eliminating the procurator’s control over investigation of
criminal cases), and by eliminating the procurator’s vestigial
judicial functions (i.e., procurator’s power to determine the
legality of an investigation), law 87-Ф3 sets up a system that is
capable of proper functioning. However, this reform, even if
properly implemented, will not be sufficient to produce a
prosecutorial service comparable to western standards. The
procuracy’s reliance on its ability to re-open poorly investigated
cases in perpetuity as well as its reliance on the judiciary’s
eagerness to overturn acquittals will also need to be separately
addressed. 79
Finally, the obvious can also be stated: no reform will truly
be successful until Russia’s flagrant and pervasive corruption
is somehow mitigated to some degree. Criminal investigation
is not only a tool used by the politically powerful, but a way to
promote various business interests ranging from giant to small
businesses: from backwoods villages to the centers of power, a
criminal case opening that was “contracted for,” remains as a
common business expense in dealing with unwanted
77 See Thaman, supra note 10, at 370-72 n.103; see also GREENBERG,
supra note 2, at 22 (citing Stanislaw Pomorski, Modern Russian Criminal
Procedure: The Adversarial Principle and Guilty Plea, 17 CRIM. L.F. 129, 147
(2006)).
78 See Thaman, supra note 10, at 370-72 n.103.
79 For an in depth analysis of the Russian practices of vacating from trial
and re-opening of poorly investigated cases as well of overturning acquittals
based on procedural errors committed during the investigation, see id. at 357.
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competition. 80
Such competition is eliminated when
competitors are placed into preliminary detention upon the
opening of criminal cases against them. 81 In some ways law
87-Ф3 can be seen as impeding this process on its own by
increasing the scope of actors that need to be on the take. 82
Accordingly, the Russian media has speculated that the conflict
between the procuracy and the investigative committee is over
the splitting of the “pie,” rather than the underlying political
machinations. 83 It must also be pointed out that the 2001
Code’s decision to bring in procurator’s consent to criminal case
openings was also argued as motivated by anti-corruption
considerations—to curb “contracted for” case openings. The
procuracy claimed that such consent was responsible for up to
a 10% reduction in baseless case initiation. 84
CONCLUSION
Without access to reliable sources of information,
speculations about the political origins of law 87-Ф3 can never
be confirmed nor denied. Closer to unverifiable axioms than to
empirical propositions, such speculations are of limited
academic use. However, if examined procedurally, then law 87Ф3 is consistent with a series of post-Soviet reforms moving
Russian procedure closer to modern adversarial principles
embraced in the West. As such, law 87-Ф3 can be conceived of
as a remedy towards systemic Russian ills, including inept
preliminary investigation and biased judiciary. Whether or not
law 87-Ф3 can be considered a success will only be determined
over time.
For now, its success will likely depend on
introduction of concurrent reforms designed to make it harder
to re-open cases and appeal acquittals and to mitigate systemic
corruption in Russia.

80 See Sergei Mihalich, Nadzor Na Oba Vashi Doma [Oversight over Both
GAZETA
(Russ.),
Dec.
20,
2007,
of
Your
Houses],
NOVAYA
http://www.Novayagazeta.ru/data/2007/97/13.html.

81

See id.
82
83
84

Id.
Id
Burnham & Kahn, supra note 6, at 10-11.

